Do Brokers Help or Hinder the Marketing of Fresh Produce in Lusaka? Preliminary Insights from Research by Tschirley, David L. & Hichaambwa, Munguzwe
  1
POLICY SYNTHESIS 
FOOD SECURITY RESEARCH PROJECT - ZAMBIA 
Ministry of Agriculture & Cooperatives, Agricultural Consultative Forum, Michigan State University - Lusaka Zambia 
Number 39                    (Downloadable at http://wwwaec.msu.edu/agecon/fs2/zambia/index.htm)                          June 2010 
 
DO BROKERS HELP OR HINDER THE MARKETING OF FRESH PRODUCE IN 
LUSAKA? PRELIMINARY INSIGHTS FROM RESEARCH 
 
David Tschirley and Munguzwe Hichaambwa 
 
Main Points 
1.  Brokers are agents who arrange sales without taking ownership of the commodity, earning their 
money on a commission.  Brokers are a common but often controversial presence in wholesale 
markets of East and Southern Africa 
2.  Efficient brokering can be beneficial by matching buyers and sellers more effectively than if each 
had to search independently for someone to transact with. 
3.  Yet buyers and sellers can be harmed if brokers are able to behave in uncompetitive, collusive, or 
unethical ways.  In Soweto market of Lusaka, common complaints lodged by sellers are that 
brokers force sellers to use them by threatening the security of the sellers’ produce, and that the 
brokers add “hidden” commissions when selling a farmer or trader’s produce.   
4.  This policy brief explores the role of brokers in the marketing of fresh produce in Soweto Market.  
It concludes that, while brokers appear to provide some valued service to some sellers, the chaotic 
nature of the market and the lack of any regulatory and enforcement structure leads to questionable 
broker behaviour including charging of hidden commissions.  
5.  As government and city officials grapple with how to improve fresh produce wholesaling, it is 
imperative that they focus not just on physical infrastructure but also on the governance, 
regulatory, and enforcement structures without which new market places will be of little use. 
 
INTRODUCTION:  Brokers – agents who 
arrange sales without taking ownership of the 
commodity, earning their money on a 
commission -- are a common but often 
controversial presence in wholesale markets of 
East and Southern Africa.
1  Farmers and others 
selling in Soweto wholesale market in Lusaka 
have mixed opinions of brokers: some suggest 
that they are forced to sell through brokers via 
threats of stealing product if they try to sell on 
their own, while others develop relationships 
with brokers that provide greater security for 
their product and better sales opportunities.  Yet 
even these sellers lodge a common complaint – 
that brokers add price mark-ups which they take 
for themselves without the sellers’ knowledge.   
 
To better understand the role of brokers in 
Soweto’s fresh produce wholesale market, the 
ACF/MSU Food Security Research Project 
collected data from brokers and first-sellers from 
January through May, 2010.  This Policy Brief 
                                                 
1  Gabre-Madhin (2001) analyzes brokers’ contribution to 
grain market efficiency in Ethiopia. 
draws from a much larger report (FSRP 
Research Report #46) to report preliminary 
results from this work. 
 
BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES:  
Brokering services can improve market 
efficiency by economizing on search effort 
(Gabre-Madhin 2001); by developing expertise 
in gathering information on buyers and sellers 
and bringing them together to effect transactions, 
without having to put time and effort into 
managing the substantial price risk found in 
fresh produce markets, an efficient and 
competitive set of brokers can match supply with 
demand at lower cost than if all sellers and 
buyers conduct their own search.  Largely for 
this reason, all produce arriving in South 
Africa’s system of modern wholesale markets 
must legally be sold through brokers.   
 
Actual performance of a brokering system can 
be reduced in several ways: brokers may not 
behave competitively, they may hinder the flow 
of information on supply and demand or on the   2
commissions they are charging, or search costs 
may be low, suggesting little advantage from 
brokering, but buyers and sellers may be 
prevented, by law or by collusive behavior 
among brokers, from conducting their own 
search and negotiating their own transactions.   
 
Formally testing for the efficiency of a brokering 
system would require data more detailed than we 
currently have.  In the absence of such data, we 
can nevertheless develop testable hypotheses and 
may be able to draw insights regarding the 
efficiency of this process in Soweto market.   
 
First, in the absence of legal mechanisms 
requiring or precluding brokering, and assuming 
that search costs and opportunity costs of time 
differ across buyers and sellers, we expect to 
find a mix of brokered and unbrokered (direct) 
sales.  Second, due to the absence of a cold 
chain, we expect that the more perishable items 
will be most likely be sold through brokers, 
since failing to find a buyer early in the day can 
result in major financial losses for the seller. 
This suggests that among the three crops we 
studied (tomato, rape and onion) rape should 
have the highest rate of brokerage and onion the 
lowest.  Third, traders selling in the market 
should be less likely than farmers to use brokers, 
since traders have more frequent exposure to the 
market, more opportunity to develop 
relationships with retail buyers, and so should 
have lower search costs.   
 
Finally, if brokerage services are offered 
competitively, we expect that sellers with large 
quantities to transact will be more likely to do so 
through a broker, since they face a higher risk of 
not selling all their product and may also have 
higher opportunity costs of time, both of which 
favor brokering.  We also suspect that such 
sellers are generally better connected and more 
knowledgeable of the market and its participants. 
If so, this means that such sellers have lower 
search costs (thus reducing the likelihood of 
brokering) and are less likely to be maneuvered 
into a brokered transaction against their will by 
non-competitive brokers.  A finding that large 
sellers are more likely to sell through brokers 
may thus be evidence that, at least in their cases, 
brokers are offering a valued service to sellers. 
At the same time, such a result could suggest 
that smaller sellers who may benefit most from 
access to efficient brokering services (due to 
high search costs) are not able to gain that 
access, because brokers focus their effort on 
larger sellers.   
 
Before examining these hypotheses, we briefly 
describe the data we use and then review first 
seller attitudes towards brokers. 
 
DATA:  We use two sets of data in this brief.  
To examine the level of openly declared 
commissions charged by brokers, and the 
existence and level of any possible hidden or 
undeclared commissions, the ACF/MSU Food 
Security Research Project has since January 
2010 collected two additional variables during 
its normal data collection in Soweto: the price 
the first seller reported receiving for their 
product and the percent commission the broker 
charged on this price.  We compute the hidden 
or undeclared commission as the difference 
between the observed sales price for this lot to 
retailers (data FSRP has collected since 2007) 
and the price the seller reported receiving 
(collected only since January 2010).  In addition, 
FSRP carried-out a survey of 46 first sellers - a 
combination of farmers and traders – regarding 
their relationship with and attitudes towards 
brokers.   
 
HOW DO FIRST SELLERS VIEW THE 
ACTIVITIES OF BROKERS?:  First sellers in 
Soweto were asked the advantages and 
disadvantages of selling through brokers.  That 
brokers provided security to sellers’ produce was 
the most important advantage (Table 1; 56%); 
brokers helping to find customers was a far less 
important advantage (16%).  That farmers have 
more time to attend to other things while their 
produce is being sold is one of the most 
important benefits of selling through brokers the 
world over, yet only four out of 43 sellers cited 
this advantage.  In fact, these interviews and 
FSRP market reporter experience reveal that first 
sellers most often remain within the market to 
monitor sales, raising questions about the level 
of trust between brokers and sellers.  
 
The main disadvantage of using brokers was the 
lack of transparency in pricing, whereby brokers 
take a commission without the knowledge and 
consent of the farmer (Table 2; 67%). In fact the 
first sellers contend that brokering slows the 
sales process (17%) after which the brokers go 
back to the sellers to ask for a reduction in the   3
price on top of which they will still put a mark-
up for themselves (11%).  The above not 
withstanding, 28% of the interviewed sellers 
reported stable relationships with brokers, 
averaging 6 years. However, 19% of these 
reported terminating their past relationships due 
to perceived dishonesty.  
 
Table 1.  Advantages of Selling through a Broker 
Advantage Freq.  % 
Brokers provide security  24  56 
Brokers more easily to find customers  7  16 
Brokers sometimes provide some inputs  4  9 
Allows time to do other things  4  9 
No advantage  2  5 
Provide market information  1  2 
Brokers sometimes pay transport costs  1  2 
Total 43  100 
Source: Interviews with farmer first sellers 
 
Table 2. Disadvantages of Selling through a 
Broker 
Disadvantage Freq.  % 
Lack of pricing transparency  31  67 
Slows sales   8  17 
Results in reduced prices  5  11 
Make farmers make losses  1  2 
Farmers have no say on pricing  1  2 
Total 46  100 
Source: Interviews with farmer first sellers 
 
HOW COMMON IS BROKERING IN 
SOWETO MARKET?:  Examination of the 
extent of brokering by crop and by type of first 
seller confirms our first three hypotheses (Table 
3): with the exception of rape, essentially all of 
which is sold through brokers, we see a mix of 
brokered and unbrokered transactions; onion as 
expected shows the lowest rate of brokered 
transactions; and farmers of tomato and onion 
are more likely than traders to sell through 
brokers.  Differences between farmers and 
traders selling tomato, however, are not large – 
99% of tomato farmers sell through brokers 
while 89% of tomato traders do so -- suggesting 
that perishability may be more important than 
search costs in driving the seller’s decision.   
 
Table 3.   Role of Brokers in Lusaka, by Crop and 
Type of First Seller 
Tomato Rape Onion   
broker share of transactions 
Total   0.886 1.00 0.116 
By farmers  0.985 1.00 0.861 
By traders  0.851 1.00 0.027 
Source: FSRP Vegetable Market Volumes and Prices 
Monitoring Data, January 2007 to January 2009. 
 
DO OPEN BROKER COMMISSIONS 
REFLECT FULL BROKER CHARGES?:  
Table 4 presents information on openly declared 
and apparent hidden commissions. The table 
supports first sellers’ contention that the brokers 
routinely charge hidden commissions.  
Transparent commissions are 9%-10% for all 
crops except impwa and okra, which showed no 
transparent commission for most sales. Total 
commissions, however, are 17%-21% for all 
crops, including impwa and okra.   
 
To more rigorously test our hypotheses, 
including the fourth that has not yet been tested, 
we conduct a probit analysis using data collected 
from 29 October 2007 to 16 November 2009.  
Data is on individual sales lot.  We exclude all
 
Table 4.  Relative Real Broker Commission for Selected Vegetable Sales in Soweto Market, Lusaka 


































% of price of 
retailer 
(C/A) 
    (A)  (B) (C) (D) (E) (F)  (G)
Tomato  732  47,742  43,456 4,346 4,286 8,631 20  10
Rape  609  32,967  30,153 3,015 2,814 5,830 20  10
Impwa  108  46,065  37,824 139 8,241 8,380 19  <1
Sweet potato leaves  108  25,972  23,926 2,317 2,046 4,363 17  9
Pumpkin leaves  103  23,806  21,456 2,141 2,350 4,490 20  9
Okra  105  33,886  27,419 200 6,467 6,667 21  <1
Chinese cabbage  99  25,222  23,434 2,328 1,788 4,116 17  9
   4
rape transactions because essentially all 
conducted through brokers.  By including mean 
daily quantities transacted over the past month in 
addition to monthly dummy variables, we 
control for two aspects of potential seasonality: 
total volumes transacted (through the lagged 
quantity variable), and weather effects (heat and 
precipitation and their effect on product quality) 
through the monthly dummies.  Because 
seasonal patterns are different for onions and 
tomato, we run separate regressions for each, in 
addition to one regression pooling the crops. 
 
Consistent with previous results, farmers in all 
three regressions are much more likely than 
traders to sell through brokers, and the small 
number of wholesalers that operate in the market 
are even less likely than traders to use brokers 
(Table 5).  Women in all three regressions are 
more likely than males to use brokers.   
 
Table 5. Marginal Effects from Probit Analysis of Determinants of Selling Through a Broker 
 
Tomato & Onion  Tomato Onion 
Number of observations  21,592  13,642  7,211 
Prob>chi2 0.000  0.000  0.000 
Pseudo R2  0.797  0.660  0.615 
Log likelihood  -2,952  -1,643  -1,058 
Variable Dy/dx  Dy/dx  Dy/dx 
Continuous variables      
Log quantity being sold (seller’s lot size)  0.082***  0.011***  0.021*** 
Log total quantity sold in market that day  -0.060***  0.008  -0.024*** 
Log mean daily quantity sold in market over past month  -0.042*** 0.003 -0.023*** 
Trend (week)  -0.000  0.000  -0.000 
0/1 variables      
Seller is a farmer (trader excluded)  0.661***  0.236***  0.756*** 
Sellers is a wholesaler (trader excluded)  -0.568***  -0.563***  -0.020* 
Seller is female (male excluded)  0.171***  0.030***  0.108*** 
Product being sold is onion (tomato excluded)   -0.715***  -----  ----- 
Monthly dummies included but results suppressed       
Dependent variable is 1=sale made through broker, 0=sale made directly to retailer 
*** significant at 1% level; ** 5%; * 10% 
   
Our most important result is that the seller’s lot 
size in all three regressions is positively and 
significantly associated with the probability of 
selling through a broker.  To further probe the 
robustness of this result, we ran two other 
regressions, one limited to farmers and another 
limited to traders. In each case, seller’s lot size 
remained positive and significant.  As argued 
above, this result may suggest that, at least for 
these larger sellers, brokering adds value and 
involves a free choice by the sellers.  Results are 
also consistent with brokers preferring to work 
with larger sellers and perhaps not making these 
services available to the smaller sellers who may 
be most in need of them.   
 
CONCLUSIONS:  These results paint a mixed 
picture of brokering in Soweto market.  Of 
greatest concern is the chaotic nature of the 
market and the lack of any formal regulatory and 
enforcement structure for brokering activity.  As 
a result, the main advantage that sellers see in 
using brokers – security for their produce – is 
something that sellers should not have to worry 
about and brokers should not be responsible for.  
Though some sellers see additional positive 
aspects of working with brokers, mistrust 
between the groups is high and brokers appear to 
routinely charge hidden commissions.  As 
government and city officials grapple with how 
to improve fresh produce wholesaling, it is 
imperative that they focus not just on physical 
infrastructure but also on the governance, 
regulatory, and enforcement structures without 
which new market places will be of little use.  
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